In the political landscape of contemporary Indonesia, few initiatives have been launched with the scale, ambition, and political capital of the Makan Bergizi Gratis (MBG), or Free Nutritious Meals program. Championed by President Prabowo Subianto as the signature policy of his administration, the MBG program represents a colossal state investment, projected to cost tens of billions of dollars annually. Its stated objectives are laudable and strategically vital for the nation's future: to combat childhood malnutrition and stunting, which affects one in five Indonesian children; to enhance the quality of the nation's human capital; and to build a healthier, more productive generation poised to realize the vision of a "Golden Indonesia 2045".1 The program aims to provide daily meals to an unprecedented 82.9 million beneficiaries, including schoolchildren from early education through high school, toddlers under five, and pregnant and breastfeeding mothers, making it one of the largest social welfare undertakings in the world.3
However, the program's first year of implementation has exposed a profound and dangerous chasm between its noble aspirations and its operational reality. Rather than emerging as a showcase for inclusive development, the MBG program has descended into a multi-faceted national crisis, characterized by a catastrophic public health scandal, systemic governance failures, and pervasive allegations of corruption. A wave of mass food poisoning incidents has sickened thousands of children, overwhelming local healthcare systems and shattering public trust.7 Investigations have revealed a program operating in a legal and administrative vacuum, plagued by weak oversight, non-transparent procurement, and a troubling reliance on military and police logistics.7 This has created fertile ground for financial malfeasance, with Indonesia's anti-graft agency now actively investigating allegations of fraud, collusion, and embezzlement at multiple levels of the program's delivery chain.12
This report presents a comprehensive, evidence-based investigation into the systemic failures of the MBG program. It moves beyond episodic news coverage to conduct a forensic analysis of the interconnected crises in public health, governance, and anti-corruption that have defined its rollout. The central thesis of this report is that the MBG program, in its current form, serves as a critical and cautionary case study of how populist political imperatives can dangerously "outrun governance".7 The politically motivated decision to prioritize a rapid, universalist launch over careful, phased, and evidence-based implementation has created a recipe for public health emergencies, institutional decay, and the potential for massive fiscal waste. This analysis will meticulously trace the program's trajectory from a political promise to a troubled reality, map the complex ecosystem of actors involved, and deconstruct the root causes of its failures. In doing so, it will critically assess the validity of claims that the program, despite its benevolent intent, has become a "bad idea"—a high-risk gamble with public funds, public health, and public trust.
The design, speed, and subsequent turmoil of the Free Nutritious Meals (MBG) program are inextricably linked to the unique political trajectory of its chief architect, President Prabowo Subianto. The program cannot be understood merely as a public health initiative; it is, first and foremost, a political instrument shaped by a long and complex quest for power, the need to secure a defining legacy, and a governing style rooted in a military "command and control" ethos. Its fundamental flaws are not accidental byproducts of poor administration but are direct, predictable consequences of its political genesis.
Prabowo Subianto's victory in the February 2024 presidential election was the culmination of a decades-long ambition, marked by several reinventions of his public persona.15 A former special forces commander and son-in-law of Indonesia's authoritarian former president Suharto, Prabowo's career has been shadowed by serious allegations of human rights abuses, which for nearly two decades resulted in him being barred from entering the United States.15 After two unsuccessful presidential bids in 2014 and 2019, where he cultivated images as a military strongman and later a champion of Islamist groups, his 2024 campaign executed a remarkable strategic pivot.15
This transformation was twofold. First, he secured the implicit and powerful endorsement of the wildly popular outgoing president, Joko "Jokowi" Widodo, whose eldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, became Prabowo's running mate following a controversial court ruling on age limits.18 This allowed Prabowo to campaign on a platform of "continuity," promising to build upon Jokowi's successful economic policies and infrastructure projects.19 Second, he underwent a sophisticated social media rebranding, recasting his image from a stern, fiery nationalist to a "cuddly grandpa" figure, an approach that proved highly effective in appealing to Indonesia's large and influential youth demographic.18
Within this carefully constructed populist framework, the MBG program emerged as the central and most tangible policy promise of his campaign.20 It was a policy with irresistible political appeal: a universal, easily understood benefit that promised to directly address the everyday concerns of millions of families regarding nutrition and the cost of living. Unlike complex economic reforms or infrastructure plans, a free meal is a direct, visible, and daily manifestation of the state's benevolence. This made it an exceptionally powerful tool for mobilizing a broad electoral base and distinguishing his platform, cementing his image as a leader who would deliver concrete results for the people.19
While the campaign narrative was one of continuity, the MBG program was designed to be Prabowo's own signature, legacy-defining project, distinct from the infrastructure-focused legacy of his predecessor.19 The sheer scale of the ambition—to feed over 80 million people daily—was historic and intended to signal a new era of social investment. The decision to launch and rapidly expand the program within the first year of his presidency reflects a clear political calculation: the need to quickly deliver on a high-visibility promise to consolidate his mandate and build political momentum. The program was not merely a policy; it was a statement of intent, a demonstration of presidential will and capacity on a massive scale. This urgency to establish a legacy appears to have been a primary driver of the program's rushed timeline, prioritizing immediate, widespread implementation over the slower, more methodical process of building the necessary institutional and regulatory foundations.
Prabowo's extensive military background as a high-ranking general in elite units like Kopassus and Kostrad has profoundly shaped his approach to governance.15 This is evident in the MBG program's top-down, centralized, and rapid rollout. The model chosen was not one of careful piloting, gradual scaling, and localized adaptation—hallmarks of successful social programs globally. Instead, it reflected a "command and control" logic that values decisive action, logistical mobilization, and speed of execution above all else.22 The heavy involvement of the military and police in operating the program's kitchens is a direct manifestation of this mindset, viewing a complex social and public health challenge primarily as a logistical operation to be executed with military-like efficiency.11
This approach, described by analysts as "premature universalism," sought to apply a single, nationwide solution without adequate consideration for Indonesia's vast regional diversity, institutional capacity limitations, and deep-rooted governance challenges.7 The political imperative to launch quickly and at scale overrode warnings from technocrats and civil society about the immense risks involved. The very design of the program's rollout was a political choice, not just an administrative one. It prioritized the political reward of a swift, visible achievement over the prudent, risk-mitigating path of building robust systems of safety and governance first. The subsequent crises of food poisoning, corruption, and oversight failure were not therefore unfortunate accidents, but the direct and foreseeable outcomes of a political strategy that consciously accepted an enormous level of implementation risk in pursuit of a swift political victory.
The systemic failures of the Free Nutritious Meals (MBG) program are rooted in a fundamentally flawed and incomplete institutional architecture. The program was launched with billions of dollars in funding and a nationwide operational footprint but, critically, without the necessary legal and administrative scaffolding to ensure accountability, safety, and transparency. This section meticulously maps the program's operational framework, identifies the complex web of actors involved, and analyzes the consequences of the governance vacuum at its core. The evidence suggests that this lack of a clear regulatory framework was not a simple administrative delay but a critical design flaw that created ambiguity, diffused responsibility, and enabled a centrally controlled rollout unconstrained by legal checks and balances.
At the apex of the MBG program's structure is the newly created National Nutrition Agency, or Badan Gizi Nasional (BGN).7 Tasked with coordinating this massive national initiative, the BGN is, on paper, the central nervous system of the entire operation. Its responsibilities include setting nutritional standards, overseeing the establishment of kitchens, and ensuring the program's smooth implementation across the archipelago.4
However, the BGN was established with a fatal flaw. Multiple independent analyses and reports from watchdog organizations have highlighted that the program was launched and had been operating for over nine months without a Presidential Regulation (Peraturan Presiden) to formally and legally define the BGN's powers, duties, and accountability mechanisms.7 This omission is not a minor bureaucratic detail; it is a profound governance failure that created a legal and administrative void at the heart of the program. Without this foundational legal instrument, there were no clear, legally binding rules governing procurement, no enforceable food safety standards, no standardized operational procedures, and no defined lines of accountability. The BGN was left to manage a multi-billion-dollar national program with immense public health implications based on ad-hoc directives and internal guidelines, rather than a robust, transparent, and legally enforceable framework. This ambiguity rendered effective oversight nearly impossible and created an environment where responsibility for failures could be easily deflected, a reality that became starkly evident when the mass poisoning crises erupted.
The on-the-ground implementation of the MBG program is carried out by a vast network of local kitchens, officially known as Satuan Pemenuhan Pelayanan Gizi (SPPGs), or Nutrition Fulfillment Service Units.6 By October 2025, over 10,500 of these SPPGs were reportedly in operation across the country.6 These units are responsible for sourcing ingredients, preparing meals according to BGN guidelines, and distributing them to schools and other beneficiaries in their designated areas.
The operators of these SPPGs are highly diverse. The program's design ostensibly prioritizes the involvement of local micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), cooperatives, and community groups, with the goal of stimulating local economies.25 However, the reality is more complex. The network also includes third-party catering services and, controversially, a significant number of kitchens established and run directly by the Indonesian National Military (TNI) and the National Police (Polri).11 This hybrid operational model, combining small-scale local actors with large, centralized state security institutions, has created significant challenges in standardization, quality control, and oversight.
The MBG program involves a sprawling and often overlapping network of state and non-state actors, each with different roles, interests, and levels of influence. The lack of a clear legal framework has exacerbated confusion over their respective responsibilities, contributing to the program's governance deficit. The following table provides a systematic overview of the key actors and their roles.
| Actor/Entity | Stated Role/Mandate | Observed Actions & Influence | Key Snippet References |
|---|---|---|---|
| President Prabowo Subianto | Chief proponent and visionary of the program. | Drives the program's rapid, universalist expansion; defends it against criticism by citing high "success rates"; orders reactive technical fixes after crises. | 1 |
| National Nutrition Agency (BGN) | Central coordinating body for program implementation, standard-setting, and oversight. | Operates without a clear legal mandate; issues apologies for failures; admits to negligence and weak oversight; dismisses staff for graft; deploys chefs as a technical fix. | 7 |
| Nutrition Fulfillment Service Units (SPPGs) | Local kitchens responsible for meal preparation and distribution. | A diverse network of MSMEs, caterers, and military/police units; site of numerous food safety failures and documented corruption (e.g., collusion, embezzlement). | 6 |
| TNI & Polri (Military & Police) | Provide logistical support and operate hundreds of SPPGs nationwide. | Deeply involved in operations, raising concerns of militarization, crowding out local businesses, and a lack of relevant expertise in nutrition and public health. | 11 |
| Ministry of Finance | Manages budget allocation and tracks expenditure for the program. | Records and reports on budget realization (e.g., Rp20.6 trillion spent by Oct 2025); confirms funding is sourced from the mandated 20% education budget. | 6 |
| Local Governments | Expected to support implementation and oversight at the regional level. | Role remains largely undefined and inconsistent; often reactive, setting up task forces only after poisoning incidents occur. | 32 |
| Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) | National anti-graft agency. | Has launched formal studies and investigations into the program; flagged irregularities like reduced food portions and potential for fraud in centralized funding. | 12 |
| Indonesian Ombudsman | National ombudsman institution. | Identified significant maladministration, including "brokers" exploiting regulatory loopholes and failures in the enforcement of safety standards. | 7 |
| ICW & TI Indonesia (Civil Society) | Leading anti-corruption and governance watchdog NGOs. | Warned of high corruption risks (inflated contracts, collusion); detailed systemic flaws including lack of transparency, hasty budgeting, and conflicts of interest. | 7 |
This complex and fragmented institutional landscape, operating within a governance vacuum, was ill-equipped to manage the pressures of a rapid, nationwide rollout. The absence of a clear legal framework was not merely an oversight but a foundational condition that enabled the subsequent cascade of failures. It created a system where ambiguity thrived, accountability was diffuse, and the political will of the executive could be implemented without the constraints of transparent rules and procedures. This structure allowed for maximum flexibility in the program's execution, but it came at the cost of public safety and good governance, transforming a well-intentioned social program into a high-risk enterprise from its very inception.
The first year of the Free Nutritious Meals (MBG) program is a story of two competing and ultimately incompatible narratives. The first, promoted by the government, is a narrative of unprecedented speed and scale—a historic social initiative reaching millions of beneficiaries in record time. The second, borne out by a relentless stream of public health emergencies and investigative reports, is a narrative of systemic failure, where each expansion in the program's reach was met with a corresponding and often tragic lapse in safety and oversight. This chronological account reveals a clear inverse correlation: as the program's implementation accelerated, its structural integrity deteriorated, demonstrating that the operational model was fundamentally incapable of supporting the politically mandated pace of expansion.
2023-2024: The Political Prelude During the 2024 presidential campaign, Prabowo Subianto and his running mate Gibran Rakabuming Raka prominently endorsed the free lunch program as a cornerstone of their platform, targeting over 80 million Indonesian children and mothers.20 Following their victory in the February 14 election, preparations for the ambitious rollout began. Prabowo was officially inaugurated as the 8th President of Indonesia on October 20, 2024, setting the stage for the rapid implementation of his signature policy.16
January 6, 2025: An Ambitious Launch The MBG program was officially launched nationwide with immense fanfare.5 The government announced its goal of providing free, nutritious meals to 82.9 million beneficiaries, including schoolchildren, toddlers, and pregnant and breastfeeding women, framing it as a pivotal step towards achieving the nation's Sustainable Development Goals.6 The program was hailed as one of the largest and most significant social initiatives in the country's history.
May 2025: Early Success Claims and Ominous Signs In a Plenary Cabinet Meeting on May 5, President Prabowo touted the program's early progress, reporting that it had already reached over 3.4 million students and was on track for exponential growth, projecting 22 million beneficiaries by the end of August.1 However, this narrative of success was immediately undercut by the emergence of the first significant food poisoning incidents. In response to a case that sickened around 200 people, President Prabowo publicly downplayed the severity of the problem, framing it as a statistically negligible anomaly. He argued that with over five individuals hospitalized out of three million served, the program demonstrated a "99.99 percent success rate," a rhetorical defense that would become a recurring theme as the crises mounted.8
August 2025: A Systemic Failure in Sragen The scale of the program's underlying problems became undeniable in mid-August. In what was described as the largest single food poisoning case to date, more than 360 people, mostly students, fell ill in Sragen, Central Java, after consuming MBG lunches.29 Investigations revealed that the contaminated meals—consisting of turmeric rice, omelettes, and tempeh—were prepared in a centralized kitchen run by a third-party catering service and then distributed to multiple schools. This incident was a critical turning point, demonstrating that the failures were not isolated to small, poorly managed kitchens but were also occurring within the centralized, larger-scale production model. Lab tests from a separate incident in West Java in May had already confirmed contamination with dangerous bacteria like Salmonella and E. coli.29
September 2025: The Crisis Reaches a Tipping Point September marked the nadir of the program's public health crisis. A devastating wave of mass food poisoning outbreaks swept across West Java province, sickening thousands of children and overwhelming local hospitals and clinics. Media reports broadcast distressing images of children crying in pain, being carried into overflowing hospital wards, and receiving intravenous drips in makeshift treatment posts.7 By the end of the month, official and non-governmental tallies of the victims varied but consistently numbered in the thousands, with some reports citing over 5,000, 6,000, or even 9,000 cases nationwide since January.7 Compounding the crisis, a highly publicized incident occurred in Ketapang, West Kalimantan, where 24 students and a teacher fell ill after consuming an MBG meal that featured shark meat.34 The incident sparked public outrage, not only due to the poisoning but also because of the questionable nutritional and ecological wisdom of serving a predator fish known to accumulate high levels of mercury to children. The BGN's defense—that the menu was based on "local wisdom" and the plentiful local supply of sharks—was widely criticized as an inadequate justification for a clear failure in food safety and nutritional oversight.34
Late September – October 2025: A Reactive and Scrambled Response Faced with mounting public pressure and undeniable evidence of a systemic crisis, the government initiated a series of reactive measures.
October 3, 2025: A Financial Snapshot Amidst the Turmoil Despite the escalating public health and governance crises, the program's financial engine continued to run at full throttle. The Ministry of Finance reported that as of October 3, budget realization for the MBG program had reached Rp20.6 trillion (approximately US$1.23 billion), with 31.2 million beneficiaries officially covered.6 This figure starkly illustrated the central paradox of the program's first year: while the government was successfully scaling its spending and beneficiary count, it was simultaneously failing to ensure the most basic prerequisite of the program—that the food provided would nourish, not poison, the children it was intended to help.
The widespread problems plaguing the Free Nutritious Meals (MBG) program are not a series of isolated, unfortunate incidents. They are the interconnected and mutually reinforcing symptoms of a deeply flawed policy design and a rushed, politically motivated implementation. The analysis of the program's first year reveals a cascading series of failures, where a foundational governance deficit created the conditions for rampant corruption, which in turn directly fueled a public health catastrophe. This systemic breakdown was further complicated by the controversial and inefficient militarization of a civilian social welfare program. This section deconstructs these four interlocking dimensions of the crisis.
The most alarming and visible failure of the MBG program has been its transformation into a nationwide public health scandal. The sheer scale of the food poisoning crisis has been staggering, far exceeding the "statistically insignificant" margin of error claimed by the administration.
Unprecedented Scale of Poisoning: By early October 2025, credible reports from news agencies, government bodies, and non-governmental organizations placed the number of individuals sickened by MBG meals in the thousands. While official figures varied as the crisis unfolded, tallies ranged from over 5,000 to more than 9,000 cases reported nationwide since the program's launch in January.9 The mass outbreaks, particularly in densely populated areas like West Java, overwhelmed local healthcare infrastructure, forcing hospitals to treat children in hallways and set up temporary command posts to manage the influx of patients suffering from nausea, severe stomach pain, dizziness, and vomiting.8 The human cost was immense, not only in terms of physical suffering but also in the widespread trauma and fear instilled in parents, many of whom forbade their children from consuming the meals thereafter.9
Identified Root Causes: Investigations into the poisoning incidents pointed to a consistent set of fundamental failures in food safety and handling. These were not complex or unforeseeable issues but basic lapses in hygiene and quality control. The primary causes identified included the use of spoiled or expired ingredients, poor hygiene practices by untrained kitchen staff, cross-contamination leading to the presence of dangerous bacteria such as E. coli and Salmonella, and flawed logistics, such as long delivery times and improper food storage (e.g., packing hot food in sealed containers, creating an ideal environment for bacterial growth).7 These failures occurred repeatedly across different regions and in various types of kitchens, indicating a systemic, rather than localized, problem.
Case Study: The Shark Meat Incident: The food poisoning incident in Ketapang, West Kalimantan, serves as a powerful microcosm of the program's broader failures.34 After 25 people fell ill, it was revealed they had consumed a meal featuring shark meat. The National Nutrition Agency (BGN) defended the menu choice by citing its principle of using locally sourced ingredients based on "local wisdom," noting that shark was abundant in the region.34 This defense, however, revealed a dangerous gap between abstract policy principles and essential, on-the-ground food safety knowledge. Shark, as an apex predator, is known to accumulate high levels of heavy metals like mercury, making it a questionable and potentially harmful choice for a children's nutrition program. The incident demonstrated a critical failure in nutritional oversight and risk assessment. Furthermore, it raised significant environmental concerns, as many shark populations are threatened by overfishing, and promoting their consumption runs counter to global marine conservation efforts.40 The Ketapang case thus exposed how the program's laudable goal of local sourcing, when implemented without proper scientific guidance and safety protocols, could lead to perverse and dangerous outcomes.
The public health crisis was a direct consequence of a profound governance deficit, anchored by the absence of a coherent legal and regulatory framework.
The Legal Void: As previously established, the MBG program operated for the better part of a year without a Presidential Regulation to define its legal basis and the specific powers and responsibilities of the BGN.7 This legal void was the central pillar of the governance failure. It meant there were no legally mandated and enforceable standards for procurement, food safety, kitchen certification, or staff training. Oversight was discretionary and ad-hoc rather than systematic and legally required. This lack of a firm administrative and legal scaffolding, as one analyst noted, meant the program was operating with "billions in play" but without the rules to govern them.7
Failure of Oversight: This regulatory vacuum inevitably led to a catastrophic failure of oversight. The Indonesian Ombudsman's investigation uncovered a dysfunctional system where "brokers" were able to exploit these loopholes, and the enforcement of even basic safety standards was failing.7 The BGN itself later admitted to "weak oversight" and "negligence" as the cause of the mass poisonings.8 The system lacked the capacity to adequately vet suppliers, certify thousands of kitchens, train tens of thousands of food handlers, and monitor the entire supply chain from procurement to consumption. The government's attempt to rapidly scale the program far outstripped the capacity of its nascent and legally undefined oversight mechanisms.
The program's governance deficit created a high-risk environment for corruption, a problem already deeply entrenched in Indonesia's public sector.42 With a massive budget, opaque procurement processes, and weak oversight, the MBG program became a prime target for graft and rent-seeking behavior.
Documented Fraud and Investigations: Evidence of corruption is not merely speculative; it has been documented by the nation's highest anti-graft body and even admitted by program officials.
Fiscal Concerns and Misallocation: The program's colossal budget—Rp 71 trillion (approx. US$4.2 billion) for 2025, with plans to increase it further—has raised serious concerns about fiscal sustainability.6 The decision to fund the MBG by drawing from the 20% of the state budget constitutionally mandated for education has led to fears that core educational needs, such as teacher training and classroom resources, will be shortchanged to finance kitchens that are failing basic safety standards.7
A unique and deeply concerning feature of the MBG program's implementation has been the extensive and formalized role of the Indonesian military (TNI) and police (Polri).
Deepening Military Involvement: The security apparatus is not merely a logistical partner; it is a core operator within the program. Hundreds of SPPG kitchens have been established and are run by military and police units across the country, from district military commands (Kodim) to air and naval bases.11 The military high command has publicly affirmed its commitment, with the TNI Commander ensuring "strict supervision" at military-run kitchens.11 President Prabowo has openly praised the involvement of the TNI and Polri as key to the program's success.48
Democratic Backsliding and the Return of Dwifungsi: This development has alarmed observers, who see it as part of a broader trend of democratic backsliding and a creeping return of the military's "dual function" (dwifungsi) doctrine from the Suharto era, which granted the military a formal role in civilian and political affairs.22 Involving the military so deeply in a civilian social welfare program blurs the lines between civilian and military domains, a separation that was a cornerstone of Indonesia's democratic reforms after 1998. This move is consistent with other actions under the Prabowo administration, such as appointing active military generals to lead civilian state enterprises and using troops for agricultural projects.23
Inefficiency and Crowding Out Local Enterprise: Beyond the democratic implications, the military's involvement is counterproductive from a practical standpoint. The military lacks institutional expertise in public health, nutrition, and large-scale food service management, raising the risk of inefficiency and undermining the authority of civilian institutions like the Ministry of Health.23 Furthermore, the prominent role of large, state-funded military kitchens directly contradicts the program's stated goal of empowering local economies. Instead of fostering a diverse ecosystem of local MSMEs and cooperatives, the reliance on the military risks crowding out these smaller players, who cannot compete with the logistical and institutional power of the state security apparatus.21
In conclusion, these four dimensions of failure are not independent but form an interlocking cascade. The political decision to prioritize speed over governance created a legal vacuum. This governance deficit enabled systemic corruption and cronyism. The resulting financial malfeasance directly caused the public health catastrophe, as embezzled funds translated into cheap, spoiled, and unsafe food. The militarization of the program, a symptom of the president's governing style, further complicated this dynamic by bypassing civilian expertise and potentially exacerbating opaque procurement practices. This demonstrates a complete systemic breakdown, where a political failure led inexorably to a governance failure, which enabled a corruption failure, resulting in a public health disaster.
In the face of a spiraling public health crisis and mounting evidence of systemic governance failures, the Indonesian government's response to the MBG program's troubles has been a case study in crisis management focused on containment rather than correction. The administration has adopted a strategy of acknowledging isolated problems while vehemently denying their systemic nature, pairing public relations gestures with narrow technical fixes. Crucially, it has steadfastly resisted calls for a fundamental re-evaluation of the program's design, revealing a political commitment that continues to override concerns for public safety and good governance.
The government's initial response was primarily one of damage control, aimed at assuaging public anger and managing the negative media narrative. This involved several key tactics:
This pattern of response constitutes a sophisticated communications strategy of acknowledgment without accountability. By admitting to specific, localized errors ("negligence" in a kitchen) but denying that these errors point to a flawed policy design, the administration could appear responsive while avoiding the need for a comprehensive overhaul or a halt to the program. The focus was shifted from a failed policy to isolated operational mistakes, thereby protecting the political capital invested in the flagship initiative.
Consistent with the strategy of framing the problem as operational rather than systemic, the government's primary interventions have been technical in nature. These measures, while positive in isolation, fail to address the underlying governance, corruption, and legal deficits.
While these interventions may improve hygiene in some kitchens, they are essentially treating the symptoms of the crisis, not the disease. Better chefs and cleaner equipment cannot solve problems rooted in corrupt procurement, the absence of a legal framework for accountability, or a supply chain where embezzlement leads to the purchase of substandard ingredients. These technical fixes address the final stage of meal preparation but do nothing to reform the opaque and compromised system that delivers unsafe ingredients to the kitchen door.
The clearest evidence of the government's prioritization of political momentum over public safety is its resolute refusal to temporarily suspend the program for a comprehensive evaluation. This call for a pause did not come from a radical fringe but from a broad coalition of credible experts, civil society organizations, and economic analysts.
Widespread Calls for Suspension: Watchdog groups like the Indonesian Education Monitoring Network and the Center for Indonesia's Strategic Development Initiatives explicitly called on President Prabowo to halt the program to conduct a thorough evaluation and prevent further harm to children.8 Researchers from the Center for Indonesian Policy Studies (CIPS) and the think tank Indef echoed these calls, arguing that expanding the program to 82.9 million recipients without first fixing its foundational governance and legal gaps would only worsen the existing problems.26 Even the Alliance of Indonesian Economists (AEI) formally requested the government to suspend the program, citing not only the health risks but also "severe misallocation" of the state budget.47
Despite this expert consensus, the government has been unequivocal in its rejection of a pause. President Prabowo has insisted the initiative will continue, with shortcomings to be addressed on the fly.9 State Secretary Prasetyo Hadi confirmed that the government has no plans to suspend the program.25 This intransigence reveals the core political calculus at play: halting the program, even temporarily, would be seen as an admission of systemic failure, a political setback the administration is unwilling to countenance. The decision has been made to push forward, accepting the ongoing public health risk as a tolerable cost for maintaining the political narrative of a successful and rapidly expanding flagship policy.
The design flaws and implementation failures of Indonesia's MBG program become even more apparent when benchmarked against established international models and best practices for large-scale school feeding initiatives. Decades of global experience, from neighboring countries in Asia to programs guided by United Nations agencies, have produced a clear playbook on how to structure such programs for success and sustainability. The MBG's architecture represents a significant and seemingly deliberate deviation from this proven knowledge base, suggesting that its architects prioritized a unique political agenda over well-established principles of public administration.
India's Midday Meal Scheme (now PM-POSHAN) is the world's largest school feeding program and offers a powerful, albeit imperfect, point of comparison. While the MDMS has faced its own significant challenges with corruption and food quality, its foundational structure highlights key elements that are conspicuously absent in the Indonesian model.
The World Food Programme (WFP), as a leading global authority on food assistance and the secretariat of the School Meals Coalition, has established a set of best practices for designing effective and sustainable school feeding programs.54 Evaluating the MBG against these standards reveals a profound misalignment with global expertise.
The stark divergence between the MBG's design and this established body of global knowledge suggests the program's flaws were not born of ignorance. The decision to pursue a rapid, universal, centralized, and legally ambiguous rollout was made in an environment where decades of international experience offered a clear, alternative path. This implies a willful neglect of established public administration principles, where the unique political objectives of the administration—speed, scale, and centralized control—were deliberately prioritized over the proven, albeit slower and more complex, methods for building a safe, effective, and sustainable national nutrition program.
The Free Nutritious Meals (MBG) program, conceived as President Prabowo Subianto's transformative legacy project, has, in its first year, devolved into a case study of systemic governance failure. While born from the laudable and urgent goal of combating malnutrition in Indonesia, its execution has been so profoundly flawed that it has jeopardized the very children it aims to serve. The evidence presented in this report leads to an unequivocal conclusion: the MBG program, in its current form, is not merely facing teething problems but is structurally unsound, representing a significant public health risk, a conduit for large-scale corruption, and a troubling symptom of democratic backsliding.
The program's failures are not isolated but form an interlocking cascade, originating from a single political decision to prioritize speed and scale over safety and governance. This politically motivated "premature universalism" led to the creation of a program in a deliberate legal and administrative vacuum. This governance deficit, in turn, created an environment ripe for the corruption and maladministration that is endemic in parts of Indonesia's public sector. The ensuing financial malfeasance—from portion-skimming to collusion in procurement—directly translated into the public health catastrophe of mass food poisonings, as embezzled funds were replaced with cheap, spoiled, and unsafe ingredients. The inappropriate and inefficient militarization of the program's logistics further compounded these issues, undermining civilian institutions and contradicting the stated goal of empowering local economies.
The government's response—a combination of statistical minimization, reactive technical fixes, and an adamant refusal to pause for a comprehensive review—demonstrates that political considerations continue to outweigh public welfare. The claim that the MBG program is a "bad idea" is therefore validated, not by its noble intent, but by its dangerously flawed and demonstrably harmful implementation. It has become a recipe for risk, gambling with the nation's fiscal health and, most critically, the safety of its youngest citizens. Without a fundamental and immediate course correction, the program risks being remembered not for nourishing a generation, but for poisoning children, wasting trillions of rupiah, and eroding trust in public institutions.
To salvage the program's benevolent goals and mitigate its ongoing risks, a series of immediate and fundamental reforms are required. These recommendations are designed to move beyond superficial fixes and address the root causes of the program's systemic failures.