This report assesses the nationwide protests in Indonesia during late August and early September 2025, concluding that the crisis was not a spontaneous event that threatened the administration of President Prabowo Subianto, but rather a predictable consequence of his policies that was strategically leveraged to consolidate authoritarian power. The initial trigger—the revelation of lavish lawmaker perks amidst widespread economic hardship—generated a clear "hum" of illogical state action, a key diagnostic indicator of a Minimiser regime at work. This inherent contradiction between a populist campaign narrative and governance that serves a narrow elite ignited the unrest.
The administration's response followed a classic Minimiser playbook: an initial application of extreme Suppressive Will (−ψ) to frame legitimate protest as illegitimate chaos, followed by tactical, superficial concessions designed to placate public anger without ceding substantive ground. The primary strategic outcome of this managed crisis was the September 8 cabinet reshuffle. This was not a capitulation to public demand but an opportunistic purge. Key technocratic figures who represented institutional checks on Prabowo's power, most notably Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati and Security Minister Budi Gunawan, were removed under the political cover of the crisis.
Their replacements are a combination of party loyalists and hardline contemporaries, chosen to accelerate the president's agenda. The appointment of General Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin—a figure with a deeply controversial human rights record—to the top security post signals a definitive and unambiguous shift towards a more coercive state apparatus. The crisis, far from weakening President Prabowo, has ultimately strengthened his position. It has accelerated Indonesia's "Regression/Fall from Grace" trajectory, creating a more ideologically coherent cabinet poised to execute the Minimiser agenda of systematic democratic erosion and geopolitical realignment away from the democratic world.
The wave of protests that swept Indonesia was not an unforeseen political storm but the inevitable result of a regime whose core nature is fundamentally at odds with the public good. The movement's origins, escalation, and the government's subsequent management of the crisis can be deconstructed through the Minimisation Plan framework, revealing a pattern of manufactured justification and strategic consolidation.
The protests did not materialize in a vacuum. For months, public frustration had been simmering due to a confluence of economic pressures, including a rising cost of living, soaring inflation, weak wage growth, and high unemployment. These anxieties were exacerbated by government austerity measures, including significant budget cuts to essential public services like education and healthcare, which were implemented in part to finance the president's costly populist programs, such as his $10 billion per year free school meals initiative. This created a highly combustible environment, particularly among the urban poor, the middle class, and the youth—demographics whose support had been crucial to Prabowo's election victory.
The immediate spark for the nationwide unrest was the public revelation that all 580 members of the House of Representatives were receiving a monthly housing allowance of 50 million rupiah ($3,075), a sum equivalent to between ten and twenty times the minimum wage in parts of the country. Within the Psochic Hegemony framework, this policy is a perfect example of an idea in the Extractive Evil (−υ) domain: a tangible and brazen transfer of value from the public purse to a narrow political elite at a time of widespread popular hardship.
The blatant insensitivity of this policy, enacted by a government that had campaigned on populist promises, generated the distinct "hum" described in the Investigative Primer. From the perspective of the public good, the action was grossly illogical and disproportionate. However, from the perspective of an elite-serving Minimiser regime, it was perfectly logical. This dynamic—an extractive policy (Action) leading to predictable public outrage (Reaction)—is a key diagnostic for identifying Minimiser activity. The protests also built upon pre-existing tensions from earlier in the year, when students demonstrated against other unpopular policies, most notably a controversial law expanding the military's role in civilian affairs, a key pillar of Prabowo's long-term agenda.
The protests escalated dramatically from targeted anger into nationwide violence following the death of 21-year-old ride-hailing driver Affan Kurniawan in Jakarta on August 28. Video footage showing Kurniawan being run over by an armored police vehicle circulated widely on social media, shocking the nation and becoming a powerful inflection point for the movement.
Kurniawan was not a political activist but an ordinary citizen caught in the clash while reportedly completing a food delivery order. As a gig-economy worker, he was a potent symbol of the economic precarity felt by millions of Indonesians. His death at the hands of the state transformed the protests from a specific grievance against corrupt political elites into a broader, more visceral movement against state brutality and systemic injustice. In the terminology of the Minimisation framework, he was a member of "The Compliant"—the vast, non-ideologically committed majority—who was consumed by the state's coercive apparatus.
This event provided a powerful, emotional narrative that galvanized "The Compliant" in a way that abstract policy debates could not. The rapid spread of the "Brave Pink, Hero Green" social media movement, which used the colors of a female protester's hijab and Kurniawan's delivery jacket as symbols of resistance, demonstrated this mass mobilization. The state's indiscriminate violence against an innocent bystander created a simple, unambiguous moral counter-narrative that temporarily broke the Minimiser regime's control over the information space, forcing it to react.
President Prabowo's handling of the crisis unfolded in a sequence of calculated steps that align perfectly with the Minimiser playbook for managing dissent. The response was not aimed at genuine resolution but at controlling the narrative, reasserting dominance, and exploiting the chaos for political gain.
The first phase was a textbook application of Suppressive Will (−ψ). Prabowo immediately adopted a hardline stance, vowing he would "not retreat even a step" and framing the protesters as illegitimate actors—"rioters, not protesters"—whose actions bordered on "treason and terrorism". This is a classic Minimiser tactic used to delegitimize genuine grievances and create a pretext for a forceful crackdown.
This rhetoric was swiftly followed by a second phase of coercion and control. The military was deployed in Jakarta, security forces were given orders to take the "strongest possible action" against demonstrators, and the state moved to control the information space by pressuring social media platforms like TikTok to suspend their LIVE features, which had been used by protesters to broadcast the crackdown. This demonstrated a clear preference for coercion over dialogue, a hallmark of Prabowo's operational code throughout his career.
Once the state had demonstrated its capacity for overwhelming force, Prabowo pivoted to a third phase of tactical concessions. To de-escalate the crisis on his own terms, he announced the revocation of the controversial lawmaker perks, banned non-essential overseas trips for officials, and promised a transparent investigation into the death of Affan Kurniawan. This was a narrowly targeted and superficial response, designed to address the immediate symptoms of public anger without touching upon the underlying causes of economic inequality and democratic decay.
This de-escalation set the stage for the fourth and final phase: seizing the opportunity. The crisis, which the regime's own actions had created and exacerbated, provided the perfect political cover for a long-desired cabinet reshuffle. By framing the move as a necessary response to public demands and a way to restore trust, Prabowo was able to execute a strategic purge of his cabinet, removing potential obstacles and installing loyalists to consolidate his power. This cycle—where a regime's policies create a crisis that is then used to justify an expansion of its own power—is a clear manifestation of the manufactured justification strategy central to the Minimisation Plan.
The cabinet reshuffle announced on September 8 was not a panicked reaction to public pressure but a deliberate and strategic maneuver. It was an opportunistic purge designed to remove institutional friction, consolidate control over the state apparatus, and install a more ideologically coherent team capable of accelerating the Minimiser agenda.
The two most significant dismissals were of figures who represented potential checks on President Prabowo's absolute authority, one in the economic sphere and the other in security.
Sri Mulyani was a globally respected, long-serving technocrat renowned for her strict fiscal discipline and orthodox economic management. Having served as a managing director of the World Bank, she represented an era of institutional integrity and was a crucial link to the international financial community. Her reputation for fiscal prudence was a direct obstacle to Prabowo's ambitious and costly populist spending programs, such as his signature free school meals initiative. Rumors of policy disputes between her and Prabowo had circulated for months prior to the protests. The looting of her home during the unrest provided the perfect pretext for her removal, allowing the move to be framed as a response to public anger rather than what it was: a political purge. Her departure, which caused immediate market volatility, was widely seen as marking the end of an "era of fiscal credibility" in Indonesia.
As the coordinating minister for security, Budi Gunawan held one of the most powerful positions in the Indonesian government. His removal in the immediate aftermath of the worst civil unrest in decades represents a clear move by Prabowo to centralize personal control over the entire security apparatus. The dismissal of the nation's top security chief eliminates a potential alternative power center and ensures that the state's coercive instruments are directly and unequivocally aligned with the president's command. The fact that a permanent replacement was not immediately named, and that a trusted loyalist was appointed as an interim replacement, underscores that the primary goal was removal and consolidation.
The new appointments reveal a clear pattern of prioritizing loyalty and ideological alignment over institutional independence. A hegemonic analysis of the key figures demonstrates a significant contradiction between their public framing and their true strategic function.
Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa is an experienced economist with a doctorate from Purdue University and a long history as a technocrat, most recently as head of the Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation. He is publicly framed as a competent professional who will ensure continuity and stability. His initial statements emphasized his intent to "build on Sri Mulyani's legacy" and practice responsible fiscal management, a classic "Greater Good" narrative. However, unlike his predecessor, Purbaya immediately endorsed Prabowo's ambitious 8% economic growth target as "not impossible" and criticized what he termed "sluggish government spending". This indicates a clear willingness to facilitate the president's high-spending, state-centric agenda rather than act as a check on it. His primary function is not to ensure fiscal discipline but to enable the regime's political objectives. This places the true intent of his appointment in The Greater Lie quadrant, serving the regime's interests at the potential expense of long-term fiscal stability.
Ferry Juliantono is a senior official from Prabowo's Gerindra party, serving as its deputy chairman for mass mobilization. He has a long history as an activist with deep roots in farmer and labor organizations, and was even jailed for protesting against previous governments. His appointment is framed as a move to empower the grassroots, with his primary focus being the "Merah Putih Village Cooperatives," a program designed to boost rural economies and improve the welfare of the common person. This is a "Greater Good" framing. In reality, Juliantono is a party loyalist placed in charge of a key state patronage delivery system. The village cooperatives, backed by a $1 billion government budget, serve as a mechanism to channel state resources directly to rural constituencies, building political dependency and strengthening Gerindra's power base. While framed as universally beneficial, the true beneficiary is the party ("My Group"). This places his true intent at the intersection of the origin and The Lesser Good quadrant, as he is a political operative managing a patronage network under the guise of economic development.
The appointment of retired General Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, even in an acting capacity, is the most telling move of the reshuffle. A former Kopassus commander and Prabowo's classmate at the military academy, Sjamsoeddin has a deeply controversial past with credible allegations linking him to numerous gross human rights violations, including the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre in East Timor, the 1997-98 activist kidnappings, and the 1998 Trisakti student shootings. His record once led to him being denied a visa to the United States. The public framing of his appointment is that of a seasoned military figure needed to restore law and order after violent riots—a "Lesser Good" narrative of using suppressive force for the benefit of all. However, Sjamsoeddin's entire career is the embodiment of Suppressive Will (−ψ) used for Extractive Evil (−υ): the violent crushing of dissent to preserve an authoritarian elite. His appointment is not about restoring public order; it is an unambiguous signal to any opposition that the regime will not hesitate to use the most brutal methods of the Suharto era to maintain power. This places him squarely in The Lesser Lie quadrant. This appointment is not an oversight; it is a declaration of intent, shattering the soft "Gemoy" persona of the election campaign and signaling a return to the politics of fear.
The creation of a new, dedicated Ministry of Hajj and Umrah is framed as a "Greater Good" initiative to professionalize and improve services for millions of Indonesian pilgrims. The new minister, Irfan Yusuf, is a Gerindra politician and the grandson of the founder of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia's largest Islamic organization. His deputy, Dahnil Anzar Simanjuntak, is also a Gerindra politician and the former head of the youth wing of Muhammadiyah, the nation's second-largest Islamic organization. This move serves two key strategic purposes for the regime. First, it centralizes state control over a massive logistical and financial operation. Second, and more importantly, it is a political tool to co-opt and manage Indonesia's two largest Islamic organizations by appointing their figures to lead it. The true intent is to serve the Selfish Interest of the ruling coalition by securing the allegiance of a critical constituency, placing it in The Lesser Good quadrant.
There is insufficient open-source information on the personal background or political affiliation of the new minister, Muktaruddin, who replaces Abdul Kadir Karding. Analysis must therefore focus on the institution he now leads. The ministry was recently elevated from an agency, with the stated goal of providing better protection for Indonesian workers abroad—a clear "Greater Good" framing (+υ). However, this centralization of power also allows for greater state control over a significant demographic and a key source of foreign remittances, which could serve the regime's political and economic interests (Origin). Without further data on the minister himself, a definitive hegemonic vector cannot be plotted, representing a key intelligence gap.
The synthesis of these events, analyzed through the Psochic Hegemony framework, reveals a clear and deliberate strategic pivot by the Prabowo administration. The cabinet reshuffle was not merely a personnel change but a qualitative shift in the nature of the government, designed to accelerate Indonesia's regression into a more authoritarian state.
The following table provides a consolidated vector analysis of the new ministerial appointments. It quantifies the strategic deception inherent in the reshuffle by measuring the distance between the public framing of each appointment and its assessed true intent. A high "Contradiction Score" indicates a significant and deliberate act of narrative warfare, a core tactic of the Minimisation Plan.
| Minister | Portfolio | Stated Intent (Framed Vector Ff) | Assessed True Intent (True Vector Ft) | Hegemony Quadrant (True Intent) | Contradiction Score (∥Ff−Ft∥) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Purbaya Y. Sadewa | Finance | "Competent technocrat ensuring fiscal stability (+υ,+ψ)" | "Pliant enabler of high-risk populist spending (−υ,+ψ)" | The Greater Lie | High |
| Ferry Juliantono | Cooperatives | "Grassroots empowerment for rural prosperity (+υ,+ψ)" | "Party loyalist managing a state patronage network (Origin, +ψ)" | The Lesser Good | Medium |
| Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin | Act. Security | "Seasoned general restoring law and order (+υ,−ψ)" | "Hardline enforcer signaling return to violent suppression (−υ,−ψ)" | The Lesser Lie | Very High |
| Irfan Yusuf | Hajj & Umrah | "Professionalizing services for pilgrims (+υ,+ψ)" | "Political co-optation of key religious groups (Origin, +ψ)" | The Lesser Good | Medium |
| Muktaruddin | Migrant Workers | "Better protection for workers abroad (+υ,+ψ)" | "Centralized state control over key demographic (Origin, +ψ)" | Indeterminate | Indeterminate |
The initial intelligence assessment of President Prabowo concluded that his presidency placed Indonesia on a trajectory of "Regression and a Fall from Grace". The events of the protest crisis and the subsequent reshuffle have acted as a powerful accelerant on this path. The initial "big tent" cabinet, formed by co-opting nearly all political parties, created the potential for internal friction and institutional resistance to a radical agenda. The reshuffle has purged the government of this friction.
By removing institutional checks (Sri Mulyani) and installing hardline enforcers (Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin), the regime has eliminated internal obstacles to its agenda. The new cabinet is more ideologically pure and more directly subordinate to Prabowo's personal will. The composite vector of this new government points further downward on the moral axis (−υ) and toward the extremes of will: suppressive will (−ψ) for security and proactive will (+ψ) for patronage and high-risk spending. This steepens the nation's downward trajectory toward the "Greater Lie" quadrant, a political space characterized by low freedom and extractive benefits for a ruling elite.
The Prabowo administration successfully weathered its first major domestic crisis by applying a classic Minimiser playbook: it leveraged the chaos it helped create to justify a consolidation of power. The September 8 cabinet reshuffle was not a concession to protesters but a strategic victory for the president, resulting in a government better equipped to pursue its core objectives of democratic erosion and geopolitical realignment.
Based on this analysis, analytical resources should be focused on monitoring the following forward-looking indicators, which will signal the further advancement of the Minimisation Plan in Indonesia: