This report deconstructs the complex and indirect "friend of a friend" relationships between the State of Israel and Hamas that are facilitated by the People's Republic of China (PRC). It argues that no direct or tacit alliance exists among the three. Instead, a series of overlapping, often contradictory, bilateral relationships cultivated by Beijing creates a "shadow network" of influence, communication, and strategic enablement. This network fundamentally alters the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East, challenging the traditional U.S.-led diplomatic and security architecture.
The primary alliance chains operate through China's strategic partners who are also key patrons or hosts of Hamas, most notably the Islamic Republic of Iran and the State of Qatar. The deep, technology-focused economic relationship between Israel and China provides Beijing with significant leverage and insight into one side of the conflict. Concurrently, its robust diplomatic and economic ties with Iran and Qatar afford it privileged access to the other. China's ability to compartmentalize these antagonistic relationships is the central feature enabling the existence of these indirect conduits.
China's motivations are rooted in its broader geopolitical competition with the United States. By engaging all parties—including non-state actors like Hamas, which it deliberately refuses to label as a terrorist organization—Beijing seeks to displace the U.S. as the primary regional arbiter. This strategy is designed to curry favor with the Arab world and the Global South, secure China's vital economic and energy interests, and portray Washington as a biased and destabilizing force.
The report concludes that while these indirect chains create new and profound strategic complexities for Israel and the United States, China's influence remains largely transactional and lacks the capacity for genuine conflict resolution. The key implication is not that China will replace the U.S. as a regional security guarantor, but that its actions are successfully eroding the U.S.-led diplomatic order. This fosters a more fragmented, multi-polar environment where sworn adversaries like Israel and Hamas find themselves inextricably linked through the strategic calculus of a competing great power, with significant and often hazardous consequences.
The intricate web of connections involving China, Israel, and Hamas is anchored in the paradoxical nature of the Sino-Israeli relationship. This partnership, foundational to understanding one side of the indirect alliance chain, is characterized by a profound duality: a deep, pragmatic, and mutually beneficial economic and technological symbiosis that coexists with significant and growing geopolitical friction. This divergence is most evident in China's staunchly pro-Palestinian diplomatic posture and its strategic alignment with Israel's primary regional adversaries. For decades, both nations operated under the assumption that these two tracks could be effectively compartmentalized. However, recent events have demonstrated the limits of this approach, revealing that for an aspiring superpower like China, economics and geopolitics are ultimately inseparable. Beijing has skillfully exploited this paradox, leveraging its economic partnership with Israel to build regional credibility while simultaneously pursuing a political agenda that often runs counter to Israeli security interests.
The relationship between the People's Republic of China and Israel did not commence with the establishment of formal diplomatic ties in 1992. Its origins are rooted in a period of clandestine military cooperation during the 1980s, forged by a shared strategic imperative to counter the Soviet Union.1 Both nations opposed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and found common cause in supporting the Afghan mujahideen. Israel, with its extensive experience operating and upgrading Soviet-made weaponry captured in its wars with Arab states, became an ideal partner for the People's Liberation Army (PLA), which was seeking to modernize its own Soviet-derived arsenal.3 Israel sold China technology to upgrade its tanks and aircraft, and shared expertise on unmanned aerial vehicles.1
This covert military relationship was not only tolerated but was actively encouraged by the United States. During the Cold War, the American administration viewed a strengthened China as a crucial strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union. Unable to sell arms directly to Beijing due to export controls and political sensitivities with its East Asian allies, the U.S. saw its close and trusted ally, Israel, as a perfect intermediary.3 This arrangement created what was perceived as a "win-win-win" situation: China gained access to advanced military technology, Israel opened a vast new market for its defense industry and gained a political foothold in a major world power, and the U.S. achieved its strategic goal of bolstering China against the USSR without direct involvement.3 This early American facilitation was instrumental in building the initial foundation of trust and the channels for high-level technological exchange between Jerusalem and Beijing.
With the end of the Cold War and the formalization of diplomatic relations in 1992, the relationship began to transition into the public sphere. The initial years were not without friction, highlighted by a security fiasco in which Israeli officials suspected that thermal cups sent as holiday gifts from the Chinese embassy contained listening devices. Although the alarm proved false, the incident underscored a persistent undercurrent of mistrust between the two nations' security establishments.3
The decisive pivot from a military-centric to an economic-centric partnership was accelerated by direct and sustained pressure from the United States in the late 1990s and early 2000s. As China's status shifted in Washington's eyes from a strategic partner against the Soviets to a rising strategic competitor, the U.S. grew increasingly alarmed by the transfer of sensitive defense technology. Washington intervened forcefully to compel Israel to cancel two major defense deals: the sale of the advanced PHALCON airborne early warning radar system and a contract to upgrade HARPY attack drones previously sold to China.4 The U.S. contended that these systems contained restricted American-origin technology and would alter the military balance in the Taiwan Strait. The diplomatic fallout was severe, leading to a temporary crisis in U.S.-Israel relations and forcing Israel to overhaul its defense export control regime. This American intervention effectively severed the overt Sino-Israeli defense relationship, compelling both countries to re-orient their partnership toward the civilian economic and technological spheres.4 The established channels of cooperation, however, did not disappear; they were simply repurposed for a new era of economic engagement.
In the decades following the termination of formal defense ties, the Sino-Israeli relationship blossomed into a formidable economic partnership. This era of cooperation, which former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described in 2017 as a "marriage made in heaven," was built on a shared appreciation for technology and innovation.5 Bilateral trade exploded, surging from a mere $50 million in 1992 to over $10 billion by 2013, and exceeding $24 billion by 2022.1 China rapidly became Israel's second-largest trading partner globally and its largest in East Asia.1 In a remarkable sign of this deepening interdependence, China even surpassed the United States as Israel's top source of imports in the 2021–2022 period.6
The core of this economic symbiosis is technology. Beijing views Israel, the "Start-up Nation," as a global powerhouse of high-tech innovation and a model for research and development.4 Chinese leaders and corporations have aggressively sought access to Israeli expertise in critical sectors such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, agricultural technology, and communication networks to fuel China's own ambitious goals for economic and military modernization.4 This has led to a wave of Chinese investment, with major technology giants like Alibaba, Lenovo, Xiaomi, and the state-owned ChemChina establishing a significant research and investment footprint in Israel.5 In 2017, the two nations formalized this dynamic by establishing a "comprehensive partnership for innovation".4
For Israel, the economic logic of this partnership is equally compelling. China represents a vast and growing market, offering a crucial opportunity to diversify its export destinations beyond its traditional partners in the United States and Europe.4 Furthermore, China has become a vital source of capital for Israeli tech firms and a key contractor for major national infrastructure projects, many of which are linked to Beijing's flagship foreign policy venture, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).4 This deep economic entanglement created a powerful incentive on both sides to insulate the relationship from political disagreements, fostering a belief that the lucrative partnership could be compartmentalized from geopolitical realities.
The Sino-Israeli relationship does not exist in a vacuum; it operates under the constant and constraining influence of the United States. As Israel's primary security guarantor and most important strategic ally, the U.S. views the deepening ties between Jerusalem and Beijing with considerable apprehension.1 This creates a fundamental and persistent tension in Israeli foreign policy, forcing it to perform a difficult balancing act between its economic interests with China and the security imperatives of its alliance with Washington.
American concerns are primarily twofold. First is the continued worry about the transfer of dual-use technology. Washington fears that Israeli innovations acquired by Chinese firms, particularly in fields like artificial intelligence and cybersecurity, could be repurposed by the PLA to erode the U.S. military's technological advantage.4 Second, the U.S. has raised alarms about the strategic risks associated with Chinese state-owned or state-linked companies building and operating critical Israeli infrastructure, such as the port of Haifa.4 The concern is that such access could be exploited for intelligence gathering, create cybersecurity vulnerabilities, or be used as a form of political-strategic leverage against Israel in a future crisis.4
This dynamic has led to a complex triangular relationship. Israel seeks to maximize the economic benefits of its China partnership while simultaneously working to assuage American security concerns, often by implementing investment screening mechanisms at Washington's behest. The Chinese, for their part, have a nuanced view of this triangle. On one hand, they resent American interference. On the other, they perceive Israel as a potential "bridge to America," holding a belief that the influential Jewish state can lobby or otherwise influence U.S. policy in ways that might serve China's interests.2 This perception, whether accurate or not, adds another layer to Beijing's strategic calculus in its dealings with Israel.
The strategic calculus that underpinned the Sino-Israeli relationship for three decades was shattered by the events of October 7, 2023, and their aftermath. The war between Israel and Hamas subjected the long-standing Israeli assumption of compartmentalization—the belief that the robust economic partnership with China could be insulated from political and diplomatic disagreements—to an extreme stress test, which it ultimately failed.
China's official response to the Hamas attacks marked a dramatic and decisive break from the carefully balanced rhetoric of the past. Beijing refused to explicitly condemn Hamas for its atrocities.5 Instead, its official statements focused on calls for an immediate ceasefire, expressed broad concern for the humanitarian situation in Gaza, and placed the ultimate blame for the conflict on the lack of a political settlement and a two-state solution.7 As Israel's military response intensified, China's rhetoric hardened. Foreign Minister Wang Yi described Israel's actions in Gaza as having "gone beyond the scope of self-defense" and amounting to "collective punishment" of the Palestinian people.9 At the United Nations, China vetoed a U.S.-sponsored resolution that condemned Hamas but did not call for an immediate ceasefire, while consistently voting in support of resolutions critical of Israel.7
This diplomatic posture caused shock and "deep disappointment" in Jerusalem, triggering a severe rupture in the relationship.5 Israeli officials, who had hoped for at least a neutral stance from a major economic partner, were confronted with a China that had seemingly sided unequivocally with their adversaries. The crisis laid bare the reality that in the context of its overarching rivalry with the United States, China viewed the conflict not through the lens of its bilateral partnership with Israel, but as an opportunity to advance its global agenda. Beijing positioned itself as a champion of the Palestinian cause and the Global South, contrasting its calls for peace with what it portrayed as Washington's destabilizing, unconditional support for Israel.7
The fallout has been significant. Prime Minister Netanyahu went so far as to publicly accuse China and Qatar of helping to organize a "political blockade" against Israel through their influence on global media.11 Analysts now widely concur that Beijing's stance has "jeopardized its once-strong relationship with the Jewish state".5 In a clear act of diplomatic retaliation, Israel broke with its past practice of abstaining on such issues and joined a UN statement led by the UK and 50 other countries condemning China's human rights abuses against the Uyghur population in Xinjiang.9 This tit-for-tat exchange signals a new era in the relationship, one in which the strategy of compartmentalization is no longer viable. Israel has been forced into a strategic reckoning, confronting the fact that its deep economic integration with China comes with significant and unavoidable geopolitical costs, particularly during a national security crisis where Beijing's global posture is fundamentally antithetical to Israeli interests.
| Period | Key Diplomatic/Military Events | Key Economic Milestones | U.S. Stance/Involvement |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1950-1980 | Israel recognizes PRC (1950), but PRC does not reciprocate due to Cold War alignments.1 PRC supports PLO.6 | Minimal trade and contact.1 | U.S. opposes Israeli recognition of PRC, fearing Israel would join the Communist bloc.3 |
| 1980s | Clandestine military cooperation begins; Israel sells technology to upgrade Chinese tanks and planes.1 | Secret trade ties begin to develop.1 | U.S. actively encourages and supports Israeli arms sales to China as a counter to the Soviet Union.3 |
| 1992 | Formal diplomatic relations are established.1 | Bilateral trade volume at $50 million.1 | Cold War ends; U.S. stance on China begins to shift towards that of a potential competitor. |
| Late 1990s-2005 | Overt defense relationship effectively ends. | Bilateral trade grows significantly, reaching over $10 billion by 2013.1 | U.S. applies intense pressure, forcing Israel to cancel the PHALCON radar and HARPY drone deals.4 |
| 2006-2022 | Diplomatic relations focus on economic ties. Israel's PM Netanyahu calls the relationship a "marriage made in heaven" (2017).5 | "Innovative Comprehensive Partnership" signed (2017).4 Trade exceeds $24 billion (2022).6 China becomes top source of Israeli imports (2021-22).6 | U.S. expresses growing concern over Chinese investment in Israeli tech and critical infrastructure.4 |
| 2023-Present | Diplomatic rupture following Oct 7. China refuses to condemn Hamas; calls Israeli actions "beyond self-defense".9 Israel joins UN condemnation of China's Xinjiang policy.9 | Economic relationship continues but is strained by political tensions. | U.S. provides "ironclad" support for Israel in the war, creating a stark contrast with China's position.12 |
To comprehend the full scope of the indirect network connecting Israel and Hamas, one must analyze the other side of China's diplomatic ledger: its long, consistent, and strategically evolving relationship with the Palestinian cause. This policy, far from being a mere ideological holdover from the Maoist era, is a central pillar of Beijing's contemporary Middle East strategy. It is driven by a pragmatic calculation to enhance China's prestige and influence in the Arab world, to directly challenge the U.S.-dominated diplomatic order, and to position itself as a credible global peacemaker. A key component of this strategy is China's nuanced and deliberate engagement with Hamas, which it views not as a terrorist group to be isolated, but as a legitimate political actor to be managed and integrated into a future Palestinian political framework.
China's diplomatic support for the Palestinian cause is deeply rooted in its post-revolution foreign policy. The relationship was inaugurated at the 1955 Bandung Conference, a seminal event for the Non-Aligned Movement. There, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai articulated a position that would define Beijing's stance for decades, drawing a direct parallel between the Palestinian issue and China's own unresolved conflict over Taiwan (then known as Formosa). He argued that both were problems of foreign intervention and could not be solved peacefully until "outside forces was excluded".13 This framing positioned China and the Palestinians as fellow victims of imperialism and cemented an early bond of solidarity.
Throughout the Cold War, this solidarity translated into tangible support. Guided by its revolutionary ideology, Mao's China became a foremost sponsor of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), viewing its struggle as a key front in the global battle against "Western imperialism".14 Beijing provided the PLO and other, more radical militant factions—such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—with political backing, financial aid, and even military training.6
Following the death of Mao Zedong and the rise of the more pragmatic Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, China's approach shifted. The ideological fervor waned, and direct support for militant groups was curtailed.13 However, Beijing's political support for the Palestinian cause remained steadfast. This was demonstrated when China became one of the first countries to formally recognize the State of Palestine following Yasser Arafat's declaration of independence in 1988, a move made despite objections from both Israel and the United States.13 This diplomatic tradition continues to the present day. In international forums like the United Nations, China consistently votes in favor of resolutions supporting Palestinian rights and condemning Israeli actions, such as settlement construction.1 Its official and unwavering policy is the advocacy for a two-state solution based on the pre-1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as the capital of a sovereign Palestinian state.13
A central and defining element of China's modern Palestinian policy is its deliberate and unwavering refusal to designate Hamas as a terrorist organization.13 This stance places China in stark opposition to the United States, the European Union, Japan, and several other Western-aligned nations that have officially proscribed the group.17 This is not an oversight but a calculated policy choice designed to achieve specific strategic objectives. As official analyses state, China adheres to this policy "to maintain what it views as a balanced position and avoid alienating Hamas".13
By refusing to apply the terrorist label, Beijing preserves its flexibility and keeps its channels of communication open. This allows China to position itself as a potential mediator acceptable to all Palestinian factions, a role it believes the U.S. cannot play due to its pro-Israel stance and its legal and political proscription of Hamas. This policy of non-designation is a low-cost, high-reward diplomatic maneuver. It costs China little in tangible assets but earns it significant political capital and goodwill across the Arab and Muslim world, as well as with many nations in the Global South that are sympathetic to the Palestinian cause.9
The strategic value of this policy was most clearly demonstrated after the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, which Hamas won in a surprising landslide. While the U.S. and Israel refused to recognize the outcome and led an international boycott of the new Hamas-led government, China took a different path. Beijing officially referred to Hamas as the "democratically elected representatives of the Palestinian people".13 This act conferred significant international legitimacy on the Islamist group at a critical moment, directly challenging the Western-led effort to isolate it. It was a clear signal that China intended to play by its own rules in the region, prioritizing its strategic interests over alignment with the Western consensus.
China's policy of non-designation is not merely rhetorical; it is backed by a documented history of direct, high-level engagement with the Hamas leadership. This engagement serves to operationalize China's strategy, transforming its ambiguous stance into a functional diplomatic relationship.
The most prominent early example of this engagement occurred in June 2006, just months after Hamas's election victory. Ignoring protests from both the United States and Israel, Beijing extended an official invitation to the newly appointed Hamas Foreign Minister, Mahmoud al-Zahar, to attend the China-Arab Cooperation Forum in the Chinese capital.13 This move was a powerful statement, treating Hamas not as a pariah but as a legitimate interlocutor on the international stage. Interestingly, this action received praise from Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, highlighting the complex internal dynamics of Palestinian politics.13
While Chinese contacts with Hamas reportedly became less frequent after the group's violent takeover of the Gaza Strip from Fatah in 2007, the channels of communication were never fully severed.13 The relationship was maintained, ready to be activated when strategically opportune.
The period following the October 7, 2023, attacks has seen a significant and public reactivation of these channels. In March 2024, Chinese diplomat and Special Envoy for Middle East Issues, Wang Kejian, met with the political leader of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, in Doha, Qatar.18 This was the first publicly announced meeting between a Chinese official and a Hamas leader since the war began, and it followed Wang's visits to both Israel and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.19 According to a statement released by Hamas after the meeting, Wang assured Haniyeh that Beijing considers "the Hamas movement is part of the Palestinian national fabric, and China is keen on relations with it".19 This declaration is profoundly significant. It represents an explicit affirmation of Hamas's legitimacy and a clear signal of China's intent to treat the group as a permanent and integral component of the Palestinian political landscape, a position fundamentally at odds with the policies of Israel and the United States.
Building on its policy of engagement, China has actively sought to cast itself in the role of a master diplomat and peacemaker, not only in the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict but, crucially, within the fractured Palestinian political arena itself. Beijing has identified the long-standing and bitter division between Fatah, which governs the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and Hamas, which controls Gaza, as a primary obstacle to a unified Palestinian negotiating position and a key area where it can demonstrate its diplomatic prowess.
In a major diplomatic initiative, China hosted reconciliation talks between delegations from Fatah and Hamas in Beijing in April 2024.21 These talks, which the Chinese Foreign Ministry described as "in-depth and candid," resulted in the signing of the "Beijing Declaration," a pact in which both factions expressed the political will to end their division and achieve national unity.22 This event was a significant symbolic victory for Chinese diplomacy. It allowed Beijing to showcase its ability to bring bitter rivals to the negotiating table, drawing implicit and explicit comparisons to its successful mediation of the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023.21
This mediation effort is a direct and calculated challenge to the U.S.-led diplomatic framework. Chinese analysts and officials present their approach—seeking to unify all Palestinian factions, including Hamas—as a constructive and inclusive alternative to what they characterize as a failed American strategy.25 Beijing argues that the U.S. implicitly supported and benefited from the Palestinian division, as it allowed Israel to claim it had no unified partner for peace. By working to end this division, China aims to remove that pretext and create the conditions for a renewed peace process where it would play a central role.25 The ultimate goal for Beijing is to displace the U.S. from its historical position as the sole arbiter of the conflict and to promote a multilateral international peace conference, where China would participate as a great power with status and influence equal to that of the United States.9 By successfully engaging Hamas and Fatah, China has inserted itself into the very heart of Palestinian politics, an arena where American influence has waned, thereby creating the perception of diplomatic competence and momentum. This positions China to argue that any future Palestinian government, potentially including Hamas as a formal component, could be a legitimate entity, legitimized in part by the sponsorship of a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
| Date | Palestinian Faction(s) | Nature of Engagement | Key Chinese Officials Involved | Significance/Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1965 | PLO | Official Recognition | N/A | China becomes a key supporter of the PLO during the Cold War, providing political and military aid.6 |
| 1988 | PLO (State of Palestine) | Official Recognition | N/A | China is one of the first nations to recognize the State of Palestine, despite U.S. and Israeli objections.13 |
| June 2006 | Hamas | High-Level Meeting | N/A | Hamas Foreign Minister Mahmoud al-Zahar is invited to and attends the China-Arab Cooperation Forum in Beijing.13 |
| 2016 | All Factions (General) | Diplomatic Statement | President Xi Jinping | Xi reasserts support for a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital in a speech to the Arab League.13 |
| March 2024 | Hamas | High-Level Meeting | Special Envoy Wang Kejian | First publicly acknowledged meeting between China and Hamas since Oct 7; Wang meets Ismail Haniyeh in Qatar.18 |
| April 2024 | Fatah & Hamas | Intra-Palestinian Mediation | Foreign Ministry Spokesman Lin Jian (announced) | Rival factions meet in Beijing for reconciliation talks, resulting in the "Beijing Declaration" to end their division.21 |
| July 2024 | Hamas | Diplomatic Condemnation | Foreign Ministry | China condemns Israel's assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran.21 |
The most tangible and strategically significant "friend of a friend" relationships linking Israel and Hamas via China are not direct but are channeled through a network of intermediary states. These nations, primarily the Islamic Republic of Iran and the State of Qatar, serve as the principal patrons and hosts for Hamas. Crucially, they also maintain deep, multifaceted, and strategic partnerships with Beijing. These partnerships transform them into indispensable nodes in China's regional strategy, providing the conduits through which China can project influence, gather intelligence, and engage with actors like Hamas, all while maintaining a degree of separation from their more controversial activities. China's relationships with these intermediaries form a symbiotic geopolitical ecosystem: Beijing provides them with economic lifelines and diplomatic top-cover, and in return, they provide China with the on-the-ground access and influence it currently lacks.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is widely recognized as the primary state sponsor of Hamas, particularly of its military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. Tehran provides the group with extensive financial backing, advanced weaponry, and critical military training, forming the backbone of its operational capabilities.16 While U.S. intelligence assesses that Iranian leaders did not have foreknowledge of the October 7 attack, there is a broad consensus that Iran's long-term material support was essential in enabling Hamas to develop the capabilities required for such a large-scale operation. Simultaneously, China maintains a "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" with Iran, a relationship that has deepened in recent years in response to shared opposition to the United States.
This Sino-Iranian partnership is multifaceted and mutually reinforcing. Economically, China serves as Iran's most critical economic lifeline. Chinese purchases of Iranian crude oil, often at a discount and in defiance of U.S. sanctions, are the primary source of hard currency for the Iranian regime.26 It is estimated that China buys as much as 90% of Iran's total oil exports.26 This revenue is indispensable for Tehran, enabling it not only to manage its domestic economy but also to fund its extensive network of regional proxies, a network in which Hamas is a key component. Thus, while China does not directly arm or fund Hamas, its economic support for Iran is a de facto enabler of Iran's ability to do so.
Politically, China and Iran are aligned in their ambition to challenge the U.S.-led global order and promote a more multi-polar world. Iran has been integrated into China-led multilateral institutions, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the BRICS bloc, which Beijing touts as an alternative to Western-dominated global governance structures.27 China's diplomatic actions, most notably its successful brokering of a rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 2023, serve to legitimize Iran's role as a major regional power, inherently bolstering the position of its entire "Axis of Resistance," including Hamas.16 While Beijing's stated primary interest in the Middle East is stability to protect its energy security and investments under the BRI 26, its deep and institutionalized partnership with Tehran creates an unavoidable and powerful indirect link to Hamas's military and financial strength.
Qatar plays a different but equally crucial role in the Hamas support network. It serves as the political and diplomatic hub for the organization, hosting its political bureau and providing a safe haven for its leadership, including the late Ismail Haniyeh.18 This allows Hamas to conduct international diplomacy, engage in fundraising, and participate in mediation efforts from a secure base outside the confines of Gaza.
Concurrently, Qatar has cultivated a "strong relationship" and a formal "Strategic Partnership" with China, established in 2014.29 This partnership is anchored in energy. As an emirate rich in vast hydrocarbon resources, Qatar is China's number one foreign source of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG).30 The two nations have signed massive, multi-decade LNG supply contracts, some of the longest in the history of the industry, which provide long-term energy security for China and immense, stable revenue for Qatar.29 This economic interdependence is supplemented by growing financial ties, with Doha establishing a clearinghouse for the Chinese renminbi in 2015.30
What makes this connection particularly potent is a shared political perspective on Hamas. Research explicitly notes that both China and Qatar "view Hamas as a legitimate representative of Palestinian people".29 This alignment forms a crucial ideological bridge that underpins and facilitates China's engagement strategy. It is no coincidence that the pivotal meetings between Chinese envoy Wang Kejian and Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh took place in Doha.19 Qatar provides the physical and diplomatic platform—the neutral ground—where the China-Hamas connection can be activated and nurtured, away from the direct glare of the conflict zone. This allows China to pursue its diplomatic agenda with Hamas under the auspices of a state that is also a key partner in ceasefire negotiations involving the U.S. and Israel.
Egypt represents a third, more complex, intermediary node. Its strategic importance stems from its geography and its traditional diplomatic role. Egypt shares a border with the Gaza Strip and controls the Rafah crossing, the only entry and exit point to the territory not directly controlled by Israel. This makes Egypt the essential gatekeeper for humanitarian aid, commercial goods, and the movement of people, giving it significant leverage over conditions inside Gaza and, by extension, over Hamas.
Like Iran and Qatar, Egypt also boasts a "comprehensive strategic partnership" with China.32 The historical ties are deep, as Egypt was the first Arab and African nation to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC back in 1956.33 Today, China is one of Egypt's largest trading partners and a massive investor in the Egyptian economy.33 Chinese state-owned companies are heavily involved in major Egyptian infrastructure projects, most notably the development of a new administrative capital and the expansion of industrial zones around the Suez Canal, a waterway that is a critical chokepoint for global trade and a vital component of China's Maritime Silk Road.32
Egypt's relationship with Hamas is historically fraught with tension and mistrust, stemming from Hamas's origins in the Muslim Brotherhood, which is outlawed in Egypt. However, necessity has made Egypt a key mediator in successive conflicts between Israel and Hamas. Its intelligence services maintain lines of communication with the group and have been central to every ceasefire negotiation, including those following October 7.23 China's strong and growing strategic partnership with Egypt—encompassing economic, political, and even military cooperation through joint naval drills 32—provides Beijing with another indirect channel of influence. By strengthening its ties with Cairo, China gains deeper insight into the complex dynamics of the conflict and another point of leverage over the situation in Gaza, which directly impacts Hamas's governance and survival.
The international response to attacks by both Iran and Israel has involved a complex web of sanctions and punitive measures, further highlighting the geopolitical fault lines.
Actions Against Iran: Following Iran's nuclear program advancements and regional activities, Western powers have pursued sanctions. In August 2025, the UK, France, and Germany (the E3) triggered the "snapback mechanism" of the 2015 nuclear deal, designed to reimpose a host of UN sanctions on Iran, including an arms embargo and asset freezes.38 This move came after Iran failed to cooperate fully with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors.38 The effort to block these sanctions failed at the UN Security Council, with only four countries—including China and Russia—voting in favor of continued sanctions relief.38 Chinese and Russian representatives condemned the E3's move as legally flawed and counterproductive to diplomatic efforts.41 The United States, which withdrew from the nuclear deal in 2018, maintains its own extensive sanctions regime against Iran, targeting its oil sector, financial institutions, and entities—including some based in China—that support Iran's ballistic missile program.
Actions Against Israel: In response to the war in Gaza and rising violence in the West Bank, some Western nations have also taken punitive measures against Israel. The Biden administration in the U.S. issued multiple rounds of sanctions targeting extremist Israeli settlers and illegal outposts accused of violence against Palestinians.44 These sanctions block access to the U.S. financial system for the designated individuals and entities. The European Union has also taken a harder line, with its foreign policy chief proposing to suspend trade concessions under the EU-Israel Association Agreement and to impose sanctions on far-right Israeli ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, as well as violent settlers.47 However, these EU proposals face significant internal division and have not yet secured the required majority or unanimous support to be implemented.47
Synthesizing the multifaceted relationships detailed in the preceding sections reveals that China sits at the center of a complex geopolitical network. This network indirectly but effectively links Israel and Hamas through distinct, parallel chains of influence. These are not formal, tri-lateral alliances but rather emergent properties of China's highly transactional and compartmentalized foreign policy. By meticulously mapping these chains, it becomes possible to trace the flow of diplomatic legitimacy, economic resources, and strategic influence between the adversaries, all of which are routed through the central hub of Beijing. This analysis clarifies how China leverages its unique position to advance its own strategic objectives, often at the expense of the established regional order.
This chain represents the most direct and visible of the indirect connections, operating primarily in the diplomatic and political spheres. It is through this conduit that China pursues its ambition to be a regional peacemaker and mediator.
The logic of this chain is clear: China uses its economic power to secure strong bilateral relationships with both Israel and Qatar. It then leverages its partnership with Qatar to gain direct diplomatic access to the Hamas leadership, which it uses to project an image of itself as a constructive and inclusive mediator, in stark contrast to the U.S. policy of isolating the group.
This second chain is less direct and operates more in the shadows, but its impact on the military and material capabilities of Hamas is arguably more profound. It is a chain of economic enablement that directly flares the conflict by fueling one of its primary belligerents.
This chain functions as a system of indirect military financing. China does not directly arm Hamas. However, its economic patronage of Iran is the primary enabler of Iran's ability to arm Hamas. Beijing's policy creates a situation where it maintains a thriving, high-tech economic partnership with Israel while simultaneously serving as the chief economic supporter of the primary military patron of Israel's most implacable foe. This demonstrates a remarkable, if cynical, capacity for strategic compartmentalization and highlights a clear contradiction where China's actions directly contribute to the flaring of regional tensions.
It is imperative to correctly characterize the nature of these connections. They do not constitute a formal alliance in any traditional sense of the word. There is no shared ideology, no mutual defense pact, and no coordinated strategy between China, Israel, and Hamas. Rather, what exists is a web of influence that has emerged from China's distinct approach to foreign policy.
Beijing's strategy is one of transactional, "friends with everyone" diplomacy, designed to maximize its own power and influence by becoming indispensable to all actors, regardless of their relationships with one another.10 This is often described as a policy of "anti-Western neutrality".9 China's actions are not driven by an ideological affinity for Hamas or the Palestinian cause, but by a cold, pragmatic calculation of its own interests. Every move—from its refusal to condemn Hamas to its mediation efforts to its trade with Israel—is designed to achieve one or more of three overarching goals: secure its economic and energy interests, enhance its standing as a global power, and, most importantly, displace and undermine the influence of the United States.9
The existence of these parallel chains reveals the central pillar of China's grand strategy in the Middle East: to establish itself as the indispensable hub in a new, networked regional order. The traditional U.S. model of influence is based on a "hub-and-spoke" system of formal alliances with key partners (like Israel and Saudi Arabia) and the active exclusion and containment of adversaries (like Iran and Hamas). China is constructing a fundamentally different model: a universal network where it is the central node connected to all relevant actors. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict serves as a perfect laboratory for this strategy. China maintains a robust link to the key U.S.-aligned actor (Israel) while cultivating equally robust links to the key anti-U.S. actors (Iran, and Hamas via Qatar). This structure ensures that any major regional development, whether it be a peace negotiation or a military escalation, must account for Beijing's position, as it holds leverage with every party involved.
This network structure creates a profound and perilous strategic paradox, particularly for Israel. It establishes an indirect and diffuse loop of value transfer that is detrimental to Israeli security. In this loop, Israeli technological innovation is sold to Chinese companies, generating wealth and economic activity that benefits the PRC. Beijing then uses its economic might to purchase sanctioned oil from Iran, providing the Iranian regime with the revenue it needs to operate. A portion of that revenue is then funneled by Iran to Hamas in the form of weapons and funding, which are ultimately used to attack Israel. While this is not a direct or intentional process, it is an undeniable systemic consequence of the network China has built. It means that Israeli economic activity, routed through the Chinese hub, inadvertently contributes to the financial and military empowerment of its own enemy. This is the ultimate "friend of a friend" hazard, highlighting the hidden, systemic risks for any nation that pursues deep economic integration with a strategic rival that does not share its allies, values, or fundamental security interests.
The emergence of this China-centric shadow network, indirectly linking Israel and Hamas, carries profound strategic implications for all key actors and for the future geopolitical trajectory of the Middle East. It signals a shift away from a unipolar, U.S.-dominated regional order toward a more complex, multi-polar environment where competing great powers create new alignments and unforeseen vulnerabilities. Analyzing the consequences for Israel, China, and the United States, and considering potential future scenarios, is essential for navigating this new landscape.
For Israel, the China relationship has transformed from a strategic asset into a complex and hazardous dilemma.
Risks: The primary risk, laid bare by the events following October 7, is the stark realization that its second-largest trading partner's geopolitical objectives are fundamentally misaligned with its core national security requirements. China's refusal to condemn Hamas and its increasingly sharp criticism of Israel's military operations have proven that Beijing cannot be relied upon as a neutral, let alone supportive, partner in a time of crisis.5 The diplomatic rupture has shattered the long-held illusion of compartmentalization. Furthermore, the indirect economic-military enablement chain running through Iran represents a critical long-term structural vulnerability. The systemic reality that Israeli economic output can, through the Chinese hub, indirectly contribute to the funding of its enemies poses a strategic and moral hazard that can no longer be ignored. Over-reliance on China also exposes Israel to potential economic coercion and makes it more vulnerable to pressure from its key ally, the United States, which is actively seeking to limit China's access to sensitive technologies.
Opportunities: Despite the significant risks, the relationship with China continues to offer tangible benefits. It provides the Israeli economy with resilience, access to a massive market, and a crucial hedge against over-reliance on traditional Western partners.4 In theory, China's unique position as Iran's primary economic patron gives it unparalleled leverage that could be used to de-escalate regional tensions. An optimistic view would suggest that Beijing, in the interest of protecting its own regional investments, might be persuaded to restrain Iranian aggression. However, to date, China has shown very little willingness or ability to effectively exercise this leverage, prioritizing its strategic alignment with Tehran over any potential role as a security mediator for Israel.14
For China, the Israel-Hamas war has been a strategic windfall in some respects and a clear demonstration of its limitations in others.
Gains: Beijing has skillfully used the conflict to advance its global narrative and bolster its image across the Arab world and the wider Global South. By positioning itself as a pro-Palestinian advocate for peace and contrasting its stance with Washington's staunch support for Israel, China has successfully portrayed the U.S. as a biased, hypocritical, and destabilizing force in the region.7 This has resonated with many regional populations and governments, creating new openings for Chinese diplomacy. The successful mediation of the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation talks in Beijing further burnished its credentials as a major diplomatic player and a viable alternative to U.S. leadership.21 Critically, the conflict serves as a major strategic distraction for the United States, diverting high-level attention, diplomatic capital, and military resources away from the Indo-Pacific, which remains China's primary theater of strategic competition.16
Costs: China's balancing act has not been without its price. Its overtly critical stance toward Israel has severely damaged a once-thriving partnership with a global technology leader, potentially jeopardizing future access to cutting-edge innovation.5 More importantly, the conflict has exposed the significant gap between China's diplomatic ambitions and its actual capabilities. Despite its powerful rhetoric and its calls for a ceasefire, China has been unable to play a meaningful role in mediating the core conflict between Israel and Hamas. That role has remained dominated by the traditional players: the United States, Qatar, and Egypt.21 This demonstrates that China's influence in the Middle East is still primarily economic and political; it lacks the deep-rooted security relationships, military presence, and willingness to bear costs that are necessary to be a true regional power broker.10
For the United States, China's actions represent a direct and accelerating challenge to its decades-long position as the principal external power in the Middle East.
China's strategy is aimed squarely at eroding U.S. influence. Its calls for a broad, international peace conference are a clear attempt to dismantle the U.S.-led bilateral negotiating framework and replace it with a multilateral forum where Washington's voice would be diluted and China's would be amplified.9 By engaging with all parties, including those the U.S. shuns like Hamas and Iran, China presents itself as a more inclusive and therefore more effective potential mediator.
The United States, however, retains formidable advantages. It possesses a vast network of military bases and security partnerships across the region that China cannot match. Its formal alliances and deep, institutionalized defense relationships with key states like Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt provide it with a level of influence that China's transactional economic partnerships cannot replicate.14 Nevertheless, the widespread regional and global dissatisfaction with U.S. policy regarding the Israel-Hamas war has created a significant political opening for China. Beijing is adept at capitalizing on this anti-Western sentiment to expand its diplomatic and economic footprint, slowly but surely chipping away at the foundations of American dominance.12
Looking ahead, the complex dynamic between China, Israel, and the broader conflict network could evolve along several distinct paths: